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ARE RETAIL INVESTORS BETTER OFF 
TODAY? 
Barbara Black* 
In recent years retail investors—individual investors who, compared to 
institutional investors or wealthy individual investors, have modest 
portfolios, a lesser degree of investment acumen and less individualized 
attention from professional advisors1—have had reason to doubt the 
honesty and fairness of the securities markets and securities professionals. 
By spring 2002, the collapse of corporate giants like Enron and Worldcom 
and the bursting of the dotcom bubble revealed to these investors what 
more knowledgeable investors had long known: stock recommendations by 
sell-side analysts2 were frequently not the unbiased product of careful 
research, but instead were written to promote securities firms’ investment 
banking activities. In fall 2003, investors in mutual funds, the egalitarian 
investment product that was supposed to provide retail investors with the 
opportunity to achieve a diversified portfolio and professional management 
at low cost, were shaken by revelations of market timing3 and late trading4 
abuses. To their dismay, investors learned that certain preferred investors 
received special trading privileges to the detriment of other fund investors.5 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Charles Hartsock Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, and Director, 
Corporate Law Center. Professor Margaret V. Sachs provided invaluable assistance at critical 
stages in the formulation and writing of this paper. Corporate Law Fellows Maureen Bickley, 
Kelley Brandstetter, Sarah McWhorter (University of Cincinnati College of Law ‘09) and Aaron 
Bernay (University of Cincinnati College of Law ‘10) provided helpful research assistance. 
 1. As used in this paper, “retail investor” means any natural person who owns stock by any 
means, direct or indirect, and does not qualify as an “accredited investor” under Rule 501(a) of 
Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007). 
 2. Sell-side analysts work for large securities firms that typically have both brokerage 
customers and underwriting departments. See SEC, Investor Alert: Analyzing Analyst 
Recommendations, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
 3. Market timing is described as “mutual fund insiders’ subtle use of the inherent structures 
of mutual funds and inside information to selectively provide benefits to favored participants at 
the expense of less-favored participants.” Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The 
Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds: Market Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235, 236 
(2006). 
 4. Late trading “involves purchasing mutual fund shares at the 4:00 p.m. price after the 
market closes.” E.g., Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney Gen., State Investigation 
Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sep03a_03.html. 
 5. Id.; see also In re Theodore Charles Sihpol, III, 81 SEC Docket 177 (Sept. 16, 2003) (order 
instituting proceedings) [hereinafter In re Sihpol]. The proceeding was settled two years later. In 
re Theodore Charles Sihpol, III, Order Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a 
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Not surprisingly, investors’ confidence in the securities industry plummeted 
along with the value of their portfolios. Investors identified “dishonesty” as 
the industry’s main problem.6 
Congress and regulators responded to these scandals by asserting the 
need for reforms to restore the confidence of the retail investor.7 In the 
wake of both the market timing and late trading scandals, Congress held 
hearings and proposed legislation, and regulators brought numerous 
enforcement actions, adopted new regulations, and committed to renewed 
vigilance over the industry, all in the name of restoring investor confidence. 
This paper examines these reform efforts and assesses whether they have 
improved the environment for retail investors. 
We begin by revisiting a basic question: why is investor confidence an 
important policy? The traditional answer is that strong capital markets 
require investor confidence, because otherwise investors will flee the 
market.8 Indeed, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses 
                                                                                                                 
Cease-and-Desist Order, Securities Act Release No. 8624 (Oct. 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8624.pdf. 
 6. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, ANNUAL SIA INVESTOR SURVEY: INVESTORS’ 
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 2002, at 7–8 (2002) (on file with author); 
HARRIS INTERACTIVE, SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, ANNUAL SIA INVESTOR SURVEY: INVESTORS’ 
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 2003, at 6, 14 (2003) (on file with author). In 
2004, investors expressed mixed feelings; although six out of ten investors stated they were 
“confident” in the reforms, a majority of investors continued to believe that greed was a “big 
problem.” WIRTHLIN WORLDWIDE, SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, ANNUAL SIA INVESTOR SURVEY: 
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 6–7 (2004), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/research/surveys/pdf/2004investorsurvey.pdf. The Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), the successor to the industry trade association, Securities 
Industry Association (SIA), has not conducted an annual survey since 2004. The Investment 
Company Institute (ICI) conducts an annual tracking survey on mutual fund ownership and reports 
that the mutual fund favorability rating declined to a low of 71% in 2003 but has steadily risen 
since then, to 77% in 2006. Shareholder Sentiment About the Mutual Fund Industry, 2006, ICI 
RES. FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.ici.org/shareholders/us/fm-v15n8.pdf [hereinafter ICI Survey]. 
 7. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text; Mutual Fund Industry Practices and Their 
Effects on Individual Investors: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) 
(statement of Rep. Richard Baker, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t 
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (stating that the hearing was “a next step in the 
committee’s continuing efforts to protect America’s investors and help in the restoration of public 
confidence in the capital markets”). In late 2003, SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid stated: 
[T]he mutual fund industry cannot continue to function as it has in the past. Trust, 
honesty and fair dealing must be restored. Before average investors grow more 
disillusioned, and before we as a nation pay a heavy long-term price, we must act now 
to bring about a time of healing and reform. 
Harvey J. Goldschmid, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the ICI 2003 Securities Law Developments 
Conference: Mutual Fund Regulation: A Time for Healing and Reform (Dec. 4, 2003), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120403hjg.htm. 
 8. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-626, at 3 (1982) (stating that a purpose of securities law 
amendments was to restore investor confidence “in order to attract needed funds back into the 
U.S. capital markets”); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (stating that among the 
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investors’ investment in mutual funds as a measure of investor confidence.9 
Since the scandals, investors have returned to the markets,10 so we might 
view their return as a sign of regained trust. However, this traditional 
explanation for the importance of investor confidence has now lost much of 
its force. Today’s reality is that investing is no more an optional activity for 
most American adults than is working. American workers are increasingly 
expected to assume responsibility for their financial security in retirement, 
and thus have no choice but to invest in the markets.11 
With the diminished economic justification for investor confidence, it is 
important to consider other explanations for its importance. One reason is 
political. If investors are required to participate in markets that they 
perceive treat them unfairly, they might direct their resulting resentment 
and frustration at individual politicians or the political system as a whole. 
This explains why major securities reform generally follows market 
crashes.12 An equally compelling justification for investor confidence is 
morality. Since the present-day reality is that investors must invest in the 
markets, the government has a moral obligation to assure that investor 
confidence is warranted and that investors are treated fairly and honestly. It 
would be immoral to make investors participate in a system that they may 
rationally perceive is stacked against them. 
Moreover, while investors may have no choice about whether to invest, 
they do have many investment choices, and the choices they make will have 
a significant effect on their financial security. Their specific choices 
include, for example, whether to buy individual stocks or mutual funds, 
and, if the latter, which of the wide varieties of mutual funds should they 
choose. They must also decide whether to use the services of a financial 
services provider or make their own choices, and, if the former, what type 
                                                                                                                 
objectives in passing the Securities Exchange Act was to insure honest markets and thereby 
promote investor confidence after the 1929 crash); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Investor 
Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 408 (2000) (“Without investor trust, our market would 
be a thin shadow of its present self.”). 
 9. The SEC uses the percentage of U.S. households owning mutual funds as an indicator of 
investor confidence in assessing the Agency’s performance in promoting healthy capital markets. 
See SEC, 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 32 (Nov. 2007) [hereinafter 2007 
PAR]. All of the SEC’s Performance and Accountability Reports referred to in this article are 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about.shtml. 
 10. See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., 2007 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 3 (47th ed.), available 
at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2007_factbook.pdf. 
 11. Forty-four percent of all American households owned mutual funds in 2007 (51 million 
households in total), and 65% of those households held funds in some form of employer-
sponsored retirement account. Trends in Ownership of Mutual Funds in the United States, 2007, 
ICI RES. FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.ici.org/home/fm-v16n5.pdf; see also Jennifer O’Hare, Retail Investor Remedies under 
Rule 10b-5, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (citing statistics showing that a substantial 
number of individual U.S. investors invest directly in the markets). 
 12. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 
WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997). 
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of financial services provider should they select.13 These are important 
investment decisions that investors will be forced to make, whether or not 
they feel equipped to make them. 
Law and economics scholars will protest that an explanation based on 
morality is paternalistic and that the market provides adequate protections.14 
Their argument, however, is refuted by recent history. Retail investors were 
the victims of the conflicted research scandal,15 because the “smart money” 
(institutional and other sophisticated investors) discounted the sell-side 
analysts’ optimistic recommendations. Retail investors similarly were 
victimized by mutual fund managers and broker-dealers who gave 
preferential treatment to wealthy investors. In addition, efficient trading 
markets do not necessarily mean that retail investors will get the best advice 
on what investments to make, particularly when broker-dealers have 
conflicts of interest that may result in putting their own financial incentives 
ahead of the customers’ interests. 
In order to view investor confidence through the lens of morality, we 
must identify certain prerequisites for investor confidence. First and 
foremost, it requires a belief in honest and fair treatment. The SEC’s 
enforcement actions against insider trading are based on this belief’s 
importance to investor confidence.16 This does not mean, as the brokerage 
firms’ advertisements pitched it in the dotcom era,17 that retail investors can 
compete with professional and sophisticated investors. It is unrealistic to 
think that someone with a modest portfolio will have the same opportunities 
as someone with a multi-million dollar portfolio. Investors, however, 
should be able to have confidence that the actions of sophisticated and 
wealthy participants do not unfairly harm them. The loss of investor 
confidence resulting from both the conflicted research and mutual fund 
scandals stemmed from exactly this kind of harm.18 
Second, investor confidence requires that investors believe that they 
have the requisite tools to make sound investment choices, including the 
availability of accurate, useful information presented in clear fashion. 
Whether one subscribes to an economic or paternalistic philosophy of 
securities regulation, there is consensus that fair and full disclosure is the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. A study commissioned by the SEC reports investor confusion about the differences in the 
types of services offered by broker-dealers and investment advisers, as well as their legal 
obligations. LRN-RAND CTR. FOR CORPORATE ETHICS, LAW & GOVERNANCE, INVESTOR AND 
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS, at xxiii–xxxiv 
(pre-publication copy, Dec. 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
1_randiabdreport.pdf. 
 14. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 694 (1984). 
 15. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 16. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 657–59 (1997). 
 17. See Barbara Black, Securities Regulation in the Electronic Age: Online Trading, Discount 
Broker’s Responsibilities and Old Wine in New Bottles, 28 SEC. REG. L.J. 15, 18–19 (2000). 
 18. See sources cited supra note 6. 
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bedrock principle of federal securities law.19 This includes both information 
contained in third-party research as well as disclosures from the mutual 
fund and the brokers that sell the funds to their customers. 
Third, policy makers increasingly view investor education as an 
important aspect of fairness; the SEC identifies “encourage and promote 
informed investment decision-making” as one of the Agency’s goals.20 It is 
unfair treatment if investors must participate in markets about which they 
lack the necessary education. Investor education becomes particularly 
important with the increasing variety of investment products of greater 
complexity. In addition, many retail investors make their investment 
decisions based on recommendations from brokers. In both the conflicted 
research and mutual fund scandals, broker-dealers frequently recommended 
investment choices that proved harmful to retail investors.21 Thus, investors 
need education about basic investment theory so that they can understand 
and assess their advisors’ recommendations.22 
Finally, investor confidence requires a belief that the regulatory agency 
charged with looking out for investors is performing this task competently 
and consistently. Retail investors need to believe that the SEC is the 
“Investor’s Advocate,” as it proclaims.23 If the recent egregious instances of 
unfair treatment have not resulted in meaningful reforms that benefit retail 
investors, then they have reason to feel betrayed. 
Part I of this article summarizes the conflicted research and mutual fund 
scandals and identifies common contributing factors. Part II reviews the 
reforms enacted in response to the conflicted research scandal and offers an 
assessment on whether these reforms have resulted in an improved 
environment for retail investors. Part III provides a similar review and 
assessment with respect to the mutual funds scandal. Part IV offers a 
comparative assessment of the SEC, with particular emphasis on its efforts 
in the area of investor education. The article concludes that in these areas of 
vital interest to retail investors, the SEC’s reform efforts have, to date, 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Even those who believe that market forces should determine the optimal amount of 
disclosure do not question its importance. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency 
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 909, 928 (1994). 
 20. SEC, 2004-2009 STRATEGIC PLAN 3 (2004), available at http://sec.gov/ 
about/secstratplan0409.pdf [hereinafter 2004-2009 STRATEGIC PLAN]; see also 2007 PAR, supra 
note 9, at 6 (identifying one of its goals as “foster[ing] informed investment decision making”). 
 21. See Gus De Franco, Haui Lu & Florin Vascari, Wealth Transfer Effects of Analysts’ 
Misleading Behavior, 45 J. ACCT. RES. 71, 72 (2007). 
 22. See James Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and 
Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 130–35 (1998). Lack of financial 
sophistication is particularly acute in employer-sponsored defined contribution plans, where the 
participants may not perceive themselves as investors. See generally Susan J. Stabile, Paternalism 
Isn’t Always a Dirty Word: Can the Law Better Protect Defined Contribution Plan Participants?, 
5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 491 (2001). 
 23. SEC, How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital 
Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). 
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fallen short of the four previously identified prerequisites for investor 
confidence.24 In short, the SEC has not yet earned the accolade of the 
“Investor’s Advocate.” 
I. THE SCANDALS 
Both the conflicted research and mutual fund scandals involved 
prevalent industry practices that, as a result of dishonesty and conflicts of 
interest, gave unfair advantages to sophisticated investors and other market 
participants. The practices also harmed retail investors who did not 
understand the degree to which more knowledgeable participants could take 
unfair advantage of the system. 
A. CONFLICTED RESEARCH 
The financial press reported suspicions about the objectivity of research 
recommendations at least by summer 2001,25 when a House of 
Representatives subcommittee held hearings on the subject. Witnesses 
described common practices that included research departments’ 
participation in investment banking activities, investment banking 
departments’ influence over research analysts’ compensation, and analysts’ 
personal trading in stocks contrary to their professional or public 
recommendations.26 The conflicted research scandal thus exposed the 
subservient role of research departments within the major securities firms. 
In order to promote their firms’ investment banking businesses, analysts 
frequently issued overly optimistic research reports that they did not 
themselves believe27 and rarely issued “sell” recommendations for fear of 
issuer retaliation.28 
While sophisticated investors understood analysts’ promotional roles 
and discounted their recommendations accordingly, retail investors made 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See supra pp. 4–5. 
 25. See Jill I. Gross, Securities Analysts’ Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest: Unfair Dealing or 
Securities Fraud, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 631, 632–35 (2002) (providing a fuller description). 
 26. Analyzing the Analysts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 227 (prepared 
statement of Laura S. Unger, Acting Chair, SEC) [hereinafter Unger Testimony]. 
 27. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Johnson, No. 03 Civ. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp17922.htm (alleging analyst’s private 
conversations with senior executives at the investment firm regarding a particular company were 
contradictory to his existing “buy” recommendation for that same company); see also Affidavit of 
Eric Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 
354, at 10–11 (Apr. 8, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf 
[hereinafter Affidavit of Eric Dinallo] (alleging that analysts’ public “accumulate” 
recommendations for a variety of stocks were inconsistent with internal discussions among the 
analysts). 
 28. See Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank, “You Don’t Like Our Stock? You Are Off the 
List”—SEC Sets New Front on Conflicts by Taking Aim at Companies that Retaliate Against 
Analysts, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2003, at C1. See generally Gross, supra note 25. 
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the mistake of believing them, particularly when their brokers 
recommended the securities on the strength of the research reports.29 
Although conflicted research was not a new phenomenon,30 the problems it 
created were intensified in the final years of the twentieth century because 
of the hyperbolic nature of the stock market and the presence of so many 
unsophisticated investors. As a result, allegations that the analysts’ private 
email messages disparaged the very stocks they were publicly promoting 
generated widespread indignation.31 
B. MUTUAL FUND SCANDALS 
In fall 2003, shortly after the conflicted research scandal receded from 
national attention, the mutual fund scandal grabbed headlines. These market 
timing and late trading abuses similarly demonstrated unfair treatment of 
retail investors. 
1. Late Trading 
Because mutual funds sell and redeem their shares at their net asset 
value (NAV) and because they generally determine the NAV only on a 
daily basis, market conditions can result in stale pricing. This in turn 
presents opportunities for exploiting differences between the current and 
future NAVs. Some mutual funds allowed favored investors to arbitrage 
differences in the fund portfolio’s NAV by engaging in purchases or 
redemptions that violated the fund’s stated policies, in exchange for benefits 
to the fund managers.32 In other cases, brokers assisted their favored 
customers’ arbitrage activities by deceiving mutual funds so the customers 
could circumvent the fund’s policies.33 In both instances, long-term 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Individual investors lost about 2.5 times the amount lost by institutions. See De Franco et 
al., supra note 21, at 72. “The real effect of the overly positive research reports . . . may have been 
to cause naïve investors to hold more shares of risky securities than they would have otherwise 
held.” Erik Sirri, Investment Banks, Scope and Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest, ECON. REV. 
(Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, Ga.), Fourth Quarter 2004, at 34. 
 30. See Securities Act of 1933 § 17(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(b) (2006) (prohibiting stock 
touting); see also Unger Testimony, supra note 26, at 72 (noting that “some conflicts will always 
exist”). 
 31. See Affidavit of Eric Dinallo, supra note 27, at 10–11. 
 32. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Banc of America Capital Management, BACAP Distributors 
and Banc of America Securities to Pay $375 Million, Exit Mutual Fund Clearing Business, and 
Make Other Remedial Reforms to Settle SEC Market Timing and Late Trading Charges (Feb. 9, 
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-16.htm (finding that Banc of America 
Capital Management had allowed favored investors to engage in market timing in exchange for 
long-term investments); Press Release, SEC, Alliance Capital Management Will Pay Record $250 
Million and Make Significant Governance and Compliance Reforms to Settle SEC Charges (Dec. 
18, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-176.htm (finding that Alliance 
Capital Management had “allow[ed] market timing in certain of its mutual funds in exchange for 
fee-generating investments in other Alliance Capital investment vehicles”). 
 33. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Settled Administrative Proceeding Against Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce Subsidiaries (July 20, 2005), available at 
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investors in the fund were harmed by the dilutive impact and cost to the 
fund of these arbitrage activities. 
2. Market Timing 
The office of the New York State Attorney General (NYSAG) first 
exposed market timing as a serious problem when it settled a case in which 
a hedge fund allegedly obtained special trading arrangements with several 
major mutual fund complexes.34 Shortly thereafter, the SEC instituted its 
first proceeding against a registered representative who assisted a favored 
customer’s market timing by deceiving the mutual funds.35 These practices 
illuminated the serious conflicts of interest that can exist among the mutual 
fund, its affiliated investment adviser, favored customers and broker-
dealers. Like conflicted research, market timing was not an unknown 
problem, but the SEC apparently believed that the funds would guard 
against attempts to market time because of their interest in preventing 
dilution.36 Thus, both the conflicted research and the mutual fund abuses 
represent situations where the “smart” money knew the rules of the game 
and could take advantage of them, while the less savvy retail customers had 
no such advantage. 
II. CONFLICTED RESEARCH 
A. REFORMS 
Although the securities industry adopted some initial reforms beginning 
in 2001,37 these voluntary housecleaning efforts proved insufficient to ward 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-103.htm; Joint Press Release, SEC & NYSE, Southwest 
Securities to Pay $10 Million to Settle SEC and NYSE Supervision Charges, Relating to 
Fraudulent Market Timing and Late Trading by Southwest Registered Representatives (Jan. 10, 
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-2.htm; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 
Dallas Investment Complex and Three of Its Officers with Defrauding Hundreds of Mutual Funds 
in Market Timing and Late Trading Scheme (Dec. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-169.htm. 
 34. Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney Gen., supra note 4. 
 35. See In re Sihpol, supra note 5. 
 36. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-313, MUTUAL FUND TRADING ABUSES: 
LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM SEC NOT HAVING DETECTED VIOLATIONS AT AN EARLIER 
STAGE 10–12 (2005); see also RICHARD J. HILLMAN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-05-692T, SEC MUTUAL FUND OVERSIGHT: POSITIVE ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN, BUT 
REGULATORY CHALLENGES REMAIN 5 (2005) [hereinafter GAO-05-692T] (reporting that because 
of limited resources, SEC examinations were limited in scope and focused on areas that presented 
what were perceived as the highest risks). 
 37. Several major securities firms adopted policies that prohibited or restricted analysts’ 
ownership of shares they covered. SIA endorsed “best practices” that addressed the conflicted 
relationship between investment banking and research, and the Association for Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR) issued recommendations to promote more objective research. 
See NAT’L ASS’N SEC. DEALERS & NYSE, JOINT REPORT BY NASD AND THE NYSE ON THE 
OPERATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESEARCH ANALYST CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES 3–
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off regulation, as the enforcement efforts of the NYSAG and the SEC 
intensified. In 2002 and 2003, Congress, the SEC, the Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (SROs)38 and state regulators responded to the conflicted 
research scandal by instituting reforms for the express purpose of restoring 
investor confidence. Congress addressed research analysts’ conflicts of 
interest in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)39 because of concern that 
investors’ knowledge of analysts’ conflicts of interest harmed “the integrity 
and credibility to the public of stock analyst recommendations.”40 Believing 
it was “critical to restore investor confidence,”41 Congress mandated 
regulation “in order to improve the objectivity of research and provide 
investors with more useful and reliable information.”42 The SROs, the SEC 
and state regulators also made attempts, both individually and as a group, to 
address analysts’ conflicts of interest. 
1. The SROs 
Even prior to SOX’s enactment, the SROs had proposed changes to 
their rules to address analysts’ conflicts of interest43 and obtained SEC 
approval of these changes within three months44—a swift process by SEC 
standards. According to the SEC, these rules “represent[ed] an important 
step towards helping to rebuild investors’ confidence in the integrity of 
research and in the equities markets as a whole.”45 These rule changes 
implemented structural reforms designed to achieve two purposes: 
increasing analysts’ independence and requiring increased disclosure of 
conflicts.46 Later in 2002, the SROs filed a second round of proposed rules, 
including specific rules required by SOX that further addressed conflicts of 
interest.47 In addition, this second round of rule changes introduced a third 
purpose: improving the quality of the research. In approving the second set 
                                                                                                                 
4 (2005), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rules_regs/ 
p015803.pdf [hereinafter JOINT NASD/NYSE REPORT]. 
 38. The Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) refer to National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) and the regulatory arm of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which in July 
2007 were combined as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). See FINRA, About 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ 
CorporateInformation/index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
 39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
 40. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 32 (2002). 
 41. Id. at 33. 
 42. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-6 (2006). 
 43. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 45,526, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,526 
(proposed Mar. 14, 2002). 
 44. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 45,908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968–
69 (May 16, 2002). 
 45. Id. at 34,970. 
 46. Id. at 34,969. 
 47. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,252, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,875 
(Aug. 4, 2003). 
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of rules in July 2003,48 the SEC noted that “the rules should provide 
investors with more useful and reliable information and promote greater 
public confidence in securities research.”49 
Accordingly, the final SRO rules50 are intended to (1) reduce the 
influence over the research department by both the investment banking 
department51 and the companies that are the subjects of the research 
reports52 and also restrict the analysts’ personal trading in covered 
securities;53 (2) require disclosure of stock ownership in covered securities 
(both the firm’s and the research analyst’s) and any compensation based on 
investment banking activities or from any subject company, as well as other 
possible conflicts of interest;54 and (3) seek to assure that research analysts 
possess a certain minimum level of competence through registration and 
qualification requirements.55 The rules also require a clearer rating system56 
and information to assist the investor in assessing the recommendation.57 
2. The SEC 
The SEC independently adopted Regulation AC58 to “promote the 
integrity of research reports and investor confidence in those reports.”59 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 45,878. 
 50. Nat’l Ass’n Sec. Dealers, NASD Conduct Rules, Rule 2711: Research Analysts and 
Research Reports (2006), available at http://finra.complinet.com/finra/display/display.html?rbid= 
1189&recordid=1159006971&element_id=1159000532&highlight=2711#r1159006971 
[hereinafter NASD Rule 2711]. NYSE, Inc., Rule 472: Communications with the Public (2006), 
available at http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_6& 
manual=/nyse/nyse_rules/nyse-rules/ [hereinafter NYSE Rule 472]. The SROs have also issued 
two joint memoranda setting forth interpretive guidance. See JOINT NASD/NYSE REPORT, supra 
note 37, at exhs. B & C. The rules were further amended in April 2005 to prohibit analysts’ 
participation in road shows. Self Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 51,593, 70 
Fed. Reg. 22,168 (Apr. 28, 2005). 
 51. The investment banking department cannot review or approve the reports prior to 
publication, NASD Rule 2711(b)(2), supra note 50; NYSE Rule 472(b)(2), supra note 50. The 
investment banking department cannot supervise or control the research department in any way, 
including any involvement in compensation decisions. NASD Rule 2711(b)(1), supra note 50; 
NYSE Rule 472(b)(1), supra note 50. Research analysts cannot be involved in the solicitation of 
investment banking business, NASD Rule 2711(c)(5)–(6), supra note 50; NYSE Rule 472(b)(5)–
(6), supra note 50, and their compensation cannot be affected by investment banking services 
transactions, NASD Rule 2711(d), supra note 50; NYSE Rule 472(h), supra note 50. 
 52. NASD Rule 2711(c), supra note 50; NYSE Rule 472(b)(4), supra note 50. 
 53. NASD Rule 2711(g), supra note 50; NYSE Rule 472(e), supra note 50. 
 54. NASD Rule 2711(h), supra note 50; NYSE Rule 472(k), supra note 50. 
 55. Research analysts must pass the Research Analyst Qualification Examination (Series 
86/87). JOINT NASD/NYSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 12. Between April 1, 2004 and November 
30, 2005, 5599 research analysts and 418 research principals had satisfied the applicable 
registration and qualification requirements. Id. 
 56. Ratings must be consistent with their plain meaning. NASD Rule 2711(h)(4)–(5), supra 
note 50; NYSE Rule 472(f)–(g), supra note 50. 
 57. NASD Rule 2711(h)(6)–(7), supra note 50; NYSE Rule 472(e), (h), (j), supra note 50. 
 58. Regulation AC – Regulation Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500–505 (2007) 
[hereinafter Regulation AC]. 
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This Regulation requires that research reports contain a “clear and 
prominent” certification by each research analyst that the views expressed 
in the report accurately reflect the analyst’s personal views.60 In addition, 
the analyst must certify whether or not he received any compensation for 
his specific recommendations. If he did, he must disclose the source, 
amount and purpose of the compensation and state that it may influence the 
recommendation.61 The SEC patterned this regulation after the SOX 
requirement of CEO and CFO certification of financial statements,62 but 
otherwise added little to the regulation adopted by the SRO rules. 
3. Joint Effort: The Global Settlement 
The most widely publicized reform was the Research Analysts’ Global 
Settlement (the Global Settlement), which was agreed to in principle in 
December 2002 and finalized in April 2003.63 The signatories included the 
SEC, the NYSAG, the North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA), the SROs, and ten major securities firms. 64 Besides 
including regulatory provisions similar to the SRO rules,65 the Global 
Settlement identified a fourth objective: fostering the development of 
independent research “[t]o ensure that individual investors get access to 
objective investment advice.”66 Accordingly, the Global Settlement requires 
the firms to fund independent research, for a period of five years, at a total 
cost of $460 million. According to Eliot Spitzer, the industry subsidy was to 
provide “an alternative way to ensure that the marketplace gets the research 
it needs.”67 
The Global Settlement requires each signatory firm to contract with 
three unaffiliated research firms to provide research to the firm’s customers, 
with an outside consultant having the final authority to procure the 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 8193, 68 Fed. Reg. 9482, at 
9482 (Feb. 27, 2003). 
 60. 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(1). 
 61. 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(2). 
 62. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (2006). 
 63. Joint Press Release, SEC, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, N.Y. 
Stock Exch., Nat’l Ass’n Sec. Dealers, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement 
Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
 64. Federal Court Approves Global Research Analyst Settlement, SEC Litigation Release No. 
18,438, 81 SEC Docket 1699 (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Global Settlement Release]. Two other 
firms later agreed to substantially the same terms. See SEC Sues Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. for 
Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest and Failure to Timely Produce All E-mail, SEC Litigation 
Release No. 18,854, 83 SEC Docket 1990 (Aug. 26, 2004); SEC Sues Thomas Weisel Partners 
LLC for Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, SEC Litigation Release No. 18,855, SEC Docket 
1992 (Aug. 26, 2004). 
 65. See JOINT NASD/NYSE REPORT, supra note 37, at exh.D (provides a comparison). 
 66. Global Settlement Release, supra note 64. 
 67. See Juliet Schlosser & Elliot Spitzer, Spitzer Speaks, FORTUNE, June 9, 2003, at 168. 
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independent research.68 Specifically, the Global Settlement requires that for 
the common stock of “covered companies,”69 each firm must use reasonable 
efforts to procure independent research.70 If the independent research 
providers drop coverage or do not timely pick up coverage of the covered 
company’s stock, the firm may continue to disseminate its own research 
reports if it takes reasonable steps to request that the independent consultant 
procure coverage promptly.71 The firm must adopt policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that its registered representatives, when 
soliciting orders in the United States for the common stock of a covered 
company for which independent research is available, inform retail 
customers that they can receive independent research at no cost.72 If the 
solicitation results in a buy order, the trade confirmation must set forth the 
stock’s ratings contained in the firm’s own research reports and in the 
independent research.73 There are also two additional notice requirements 
that are not limited to solicited orders. Every account statement sent to a 
U.S. customer that reflects a position in a covered company’s stock must set 
forth the ratings contained in the firm’s own research reports and in the 
independent research.74 Notice of the availability of independent research 
must also be included “prominently” on all U.S. customers’ account 
statements, in the firm’s research reports, and on the firm’s website.75 
B. ASSESSMENT 
To some extent, the purposes of the congressional, SRO and Global 
Settlement reforms were contradictory. Congressional and SEC statements 
emphasized improving the objectivity and quality of research prepared by 
securities firms so that investors could have confidence in the firms’ 
research. The reforms, however, also mandate additional disclosure of 
conflicts, suggesting that informed investors should view the research more 
skeptically.76 Finally, the purpose behind the Global Settlement’s industry 
                                                                                                                 
 68. The terms are set forth in Global Research Analyst Settlement, Final Judgment Addendum 
A (Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18438.htm (setting 
forth the terms under III.1). 
 69. Common stock of “covered companies” is generally defined as common stock listed on a 
U.S. national securities exchange or quoted on NASDAQ and covered in the firm’s research 
reports. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at III.1(c). 
 73. Id. at III.1(h). 
 74. Global Research Analyst Settlement, Final Judgment Addendum A, at III.1(i) (Sept. 24, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18438.htm. The independent 
consultant will select the independent research ratings. Id. at III.1(j). 
 75. Id. at III.1(k). 
 76. Professor Jill Fisch advocates greater emphasis on disclosure to manage the conflicts of 
interests to replace the current model of forced separation of research and investment banking. See 
Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39, 83–90 
(2007). 
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subsidy of third-party research is uncertain. It may reflect regulatory doubt 
that the other measures77 will be sufficient to improve sell-side analysts’ 
research. Alternatively, it may anticipate that these measures will have an 
adverse impact on production of research by securities firms, since it seeks 
to assure the availability of research from other sources by requiring firms 
to supply the seed money for the development of independent research. Not 
surprisingly, considering the conflicting purposes of the reforms, the results 
have been mixed. 
1. Improving Securities Firms’ Research  
Since adoption of the SRO rules, SRO staffs have made their 
enforcement a priority.78 In December 2005, at the request of the SEC, the 
staffs of NASD and NYSE issued a joint report assessing the operation and 
effectiveness of the rules.79 While both SROs reported a large number of 
violations, it is not possible to determine whether the violations resulted 
from intentional disregard of the new rules or more benign difficulties of 
applying them.80 The report did give some notable examples of non-
compliance81 that continue to date.82 Notably, the report did not provide an 
assessment of the rules’ effectiveness from the regulators’ perspective. 
Instead, it provided summaries of academic studies and media reports and 
noted that “most have concluded that the rules have helped to address the 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 78. See JOINT NASD/NYSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 12. 
 79. Id. 
 80. NASD reported that between July 2002 and November 30, 2005 it initiated 467 
examinations reviewing firms for compliance with NASD Rule 2711 and Regulation AC; it found 
110 violations of NASD Rule 2711 and twenty-five violations of Regulation AC. The greatest 
number of violations was for failure to have adequate procedures in place to supervise the 
activities of research analysts with respect to conflicts of interest. As of November 30, 2005 
NASD Enforcement settled twenty-nine cases involving NASD Rule 2711 violations and two 
cases involving violations of Rule 1050 (the analyst registration rule). The vast majority of settled 
NASD Enforcement actions involved violations of the disclosure requirements of NASD Rule 
2711(h) relating to over 265 research reports. NASD’s Advertising Regulation Department also 
conducted sweeps of firms (including ten Global Settlement firms) to determine whether there was 
good-faith compliance with NASD Rule 2711 and found continued deficiencies in several areas. 
The NYSE reports 296 examinations between August 2002 and October 2005 that resulted in 
seventy-five firms with a total of 271 findings for partial or non-compliance with the SRO Rules 
and Regulation AC. During that same period, thirteen examination findings were referred to 
NASD Enforcement, many of which were ongoing. See id. at 13–14. 
 81. For example, one firm was fined $1.5 million for violations that included having a research 
analyst participate in a road show and a research analyst giving statements that were not fair and 
balanced. Id. at 16. 
 82. In November 2007 FINRA censured and fined Wachovia Capital Markets LLC $300,000 
for violations of the research analyst conflict of interest disclosures rules over a two-year time 
period. News Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Fines Wachovia Capital Markets 
$300,000 for Deficient Disclosures in Research Reports (Nov. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/P037532. 
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conflict-of-interest issues that have previously compromised the objectivity 
and reliability of research.”83 
Finance scholars have, indeed, conducted a number of studies on the 
success of the reforms aimed at improving research analysts’ practices. The 
research has produced mixed results.84 Some studies appear to show that the 
recommendations have become more balanced85 and less conflicted,86 
although there is skepticism about whether the conflicts of interest have 
been eliminated.87 Others have found that the reforms have had little effect 
on recommendations or their long-term investment value for investors.88 
Moreover, some conclude that analysts at investment banks already 
provided reliable research and therefore dispute that the research is now of 
better quality.89 
2. Fostering Independent Research 
Whatever the benefits of less biased research, its price is clear: a decline 
in the availability of sell-side securities analysis. According to one study, 
half of the analysts at six major firms who published research in 2003 
stopped by 2006.90 If the drafters of the Global Settlement expected that 
independent research providers would compensate for the decline in sell-
side analysis, it has not happened. Initiatives to promote issuer-sponsored 
research and to broker relationships between companies and independent 
                                                                                                                 
 83. JOINT NASD/NYSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 16. 
 84. See Fisch, supra note 76, at 72 (concluding that the early reports on the effect of the new 
regulations are mixed). 
 85. See Brad M. Barber et al., Buys, Holds, and Sells: The Distribution of Investment Banks’ 
Stock Ratings and the Implications for the Profitability of Analysts’ Recommendations (Sept. 
2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=495882). 
 86. See Ohad Kadan et al., Conflicts of Interest and Stock Recommendations—The Effects of 
the Global Settlement and Related Regulations (May 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=5688840). 
 87. See Fixing Wall Street Research Years After Global Settlement, Critics Say Conflicts 
Remain, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Nov. 10, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/ 
SB116311187931119039-OscKt8q7_5_frb0hKpQqKocn9bM_20061117.html [hereinafter Fixing 
Wall Street Research] (noting that the ratio of buys to sells is now higher than before the 
settlement). 
 88. See generally Leslie Boni, Analyzing the Analysts after the Global Settlement (Sept. 28, 
2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.tcf.or.jp/data/20050928_ 
Leslie_Boni.pdf). 
 89. See James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Market 
for Underwriting Business (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n Annual Meetings, Working Paper No. 55, 
2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/16th/art55; Jonathan Clarke et al., The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly? Differences in Analyst Behavior at Investment Banks, Brokerages and 
Independent Research Firms (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=562181); John Jacob, Steve Rock & David P. 
Weber, Do Analysts at Independent Research Firms Make Better Earnings Forecasts? (July 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=434702). 
 90. Study: 50% of Analysts Dropped Out Since ‘03, WALL ST. LETTER, May 14, 2007, 
available at http://www.researchexchange.com/WSL%20-%20NRE%20-%20051407.pdf 
(reporting on a National Research Exchange study). 
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analysts have not, to date, filled the gap. While new firms entered the field 
to provide the independent research mandated by the Global Settlement, a 
number of them have already shut down due to insufficient market 
demand.91 Moreover, there is skepticism that issuer-financed research 
provides a good solution, as it presents an equally dangerous conflict92 and, 
in particular, raises concerns about issuer retaliation.93 
The result of less sell-side research is less transparency in the markets.94 
Approximately 50% of all publicly held companies have three or fewer 
analysts95 and approximately 35% of all public companies have no analyst 
coverage.96 Since January 2002, almost seven hundred companies have 
reduced analyst coverage.97 This represents over 17% of all companies with 
analyst coverage.98 Moreover, when the Global Settlement’s subsidy of 
independent research ends in July 2009,99 the funding for independent 
research may dry up.100 The perennial problem—who will pay for 
research?—remains unsolved. 
B. DOES THE SEC CARE ABOUT RESEARCH? 
If the SEC believes that providing retail investors with useful and 
reliable research is important for investor confidence, then the Agency 
should be concerned that the effects of the reforms have proven detrimental 
to this goal and that, when the Global Settlement’s subsidy is gone, the 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Caren Chesler, Back to the Drawing Board, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Mar. 27, 2006, 
at 26 (reporting that many of the independent research firms that opened after the Global 
Settlement have shut down because investors do not want to pay for research). This includes a 
joint venture between Reuters and NASDAQ, which was formed to provide research coverage for 
small and mid-cap companies. See Joseph A. Giannone & Anupreeta Das, Nasdaq, Reuters Pull 
Plug on Research Venture, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
ousiv/idUSN1144247920070912. 
 92. Rating agencies have been criticized because they are paid by the issuer of the bonds they 
rate. See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs 
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999). 
 93. To address these issues, the CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity developed Best 
Practices Guidelines. CFA CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES 
GOVERNING ANALYST/CORPORATE ISSUER RELATIONS (2005), available at 
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2005.n7.4004. 
 94. Dana Cimilluca, Another Analyst Jumps the Wall, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2007, at B4; see 
Fixing Wall Street Research, supra note 87; Karen Richardson, Peter A. McKay & Serena Ng, 
Desperately Seeking Research, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2005, at C1; Justin Schack, Settling for 
Nothing, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 2005, at 26; Fisch, supra note 76, at 76–80. 
 95. Press Release, NASDAQ, The Independent Research Network Announces Seven Members 
to Join its Research Independence Council (Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/ 
newsroom/news/pr2005/ne_section05_111.stm. 
 96. SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES, FINAL REPORT 72 n.144 
(2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf. 
 97. Press Release, NASDAQ, supra note 95. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Chesler, supra note 91 (reporting that observers expect a shakeout in the industry 
when the settlement period ends). 
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availability of research coverage will, in all likelihood, further diminish. 
Since the Global Settlement, however, the SEC has not identified the 
availability of better research as an Agency priority.101 Indeed, the SEC’s 
recent extension of Form S-3 availability to smaller public companies102 
suggests that it does not consider research coverage as important a 
component of market efficiency as it once did. While the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis and the role of securities analysts in enhancing market 
efficiency were the guiding principles behind integrated disclosure, with the 
creation of Form S-3 and shelf registration,103 the SEC now emphasizes the 
ready availability, at low cost, of corporate disclosure documents to 
investors.104 
The SEC’s emphasis on “Plain English” disclosure105 and Chairman 
Cox’s deep interest in interactive data106 also suggest a significant, though 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Neither its 2004-2009 Strategic Plan nor any of its PARs subsequent to the Global 
Settlement address the issue. See 2004-2009 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 20; 2007 PAR, supra 
note 9; SEC, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 9 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter 
2006 PAR]; SEC, 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 7 (Nov. 2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 PAR]; SEC, 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 23 (May 
2005) [hereinafter 2004 PAR]. 
 102. In December 2007, the SEC extended Form S-3 eligibility to most corporations with 
exchange-traded securities so long as they did not offer securities worth more than one-third of 
their public float within a twelve-month period. Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for 
Primary Securities Offerings on Forms S-3 and F-3, Securities Act Release No. 8878, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 73,534 (Dec. 27, 2007). In 1992, when the SEC established the requirement of a $75 million 
public float (which was a reduction from the original $150 million), the staff based it on an 
analysis of trading markets and market following of registrants in various capitalization ranges 
and noted that approximately two-thirds of the companies that would become eligible were 
followed by at least three analysts. Simplification of Registration Procedures for Primary 
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6943, Exchange Act Release No. 30,930, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 32,461, at 32,464 (July 22, 1992). 
 103. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, Exchange Act 
Release No. 18,524, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, at 11,382 n.9 (Mar. 16, 1982) (stating that Form S-3 
relies on the efficient market theory). 
 104. See Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 73,535 (stating that in contrast to 1992, all filings on Form S-3 are now filed on EDGAR 
and are available at little or no cost). 
 105. Chairman Arthur Levitt made Plain English disclosure a priority so that “investors might 
better understand their investments.” See SEC OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ASSISTANCE, A 
PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK 1 (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/plaine.pdf. Christopher 
Cox, SEC Chairman, has continued the campaign with enthusiasm. See, e.g., Christopher Cox, 
Chairman, SEC, Keynote Address to the Center for Plain Language Symposium: Plain Language 
and Good Business (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/ 
spch101207cc.htm (stating that “disclosures intended for retail investors should be concise and 
clearly written”). Chairman Cox has also announced that the SEC will conduct a survey of 
investors to see if they find SEC filings useful. Id. 
 106. The SEC launched its interactive data filing initiative in April 2005 “to make filings more 
accessible and understandable to the common investor” and recently created an Office of 
Interactive Disclosure to lead the transformation to interactive financial reporting by public 
companies. Press Release, SEC, SEC’s Office of Interactive Disclosure Urges Public Comment as 
Interactive Data Moves Closer to Reality for Investors (Dec. 5, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-253.htm. It recently released for public comment a 
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not expressly stated, shift in the SEC’s attitude toward disclosure. For many 
years, regulatory policy focused on the role of the intermediaries, 
particularly brokers, to act as filters and interpreters of complex financial 
information.107 In contrast, Chairman Cox appears to think that retail 
investors have the time to study, and the ability to comprehend, information 
in SEC filings. This shift could be justified because of the dominant 
presence in the market of institutional investors,108 except that both 
Chairman Levitt (the architect of Plain English) and Chairman Cox have 
emphasized the importance of these developments for retail investors.109 If 
the SEC expects that retail investors will review SEC filings, that 
expectation does not appear well-founded, as indicated by polls and surveys 
demonstrating the general “financial illiteracy” of retail investors.110 
Perhaps, however, from the viewpoint of retail investors, the lack of 
independent research is not critical because, for many of them, mutual 
funds are the better investment choice. This article turns now to an 
examination and assessment of the SEC’s reforms to improve the fair 
treatment of retail investors in mutual funds. 
III. MUTUAL FUNDS 
A. REFORMS 
From fall 2003, when the NYSAG brought the first enforcement action 
involving market timing,111 through 2005, Congress held numerous 
hearings on mutual funds,112 proposed new legislation,113 and considered 
                                                                                                                 
taxonomy for GAAP accounting standards and instructions for creating financial statements in 
XBRL. Id. 
 107. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. LAW. 631, 632 
(1973) (stating that “the theory that the prospectus can be used by the lay investor is a myth”); 
SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES 
UNDER THE ‘33 AND ‘34 ACTS – THE WHEAT REPORT 52–54 (CCH 1969) (discussing the value of 
the filtration process in communicating complicated business facts to average investors). 
 108. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., JOEL SELIGMAN & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (10th ed. 2007). 
 109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 110. A 2003 survey of individual investors conducted for NASD found that 97% of investors 
believed it was important to increase their investment knowledge. More alarmingly, only 35% of 
investors answered at least seven of ten Basic Market Knowledge questions correctly. APPLIED 
RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, NASD INVESTOR LITERACY RESEARCH (2003), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/inv_info/documents/investor_information/p011459.pdf. 
 111. See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney Gen., supra note 4. 
 112. Mutual Funds: A Review of the Regulatory Landscape: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial 
Services,109th Cong. (2005); Mutual Fund Trading Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); 
Oversight Hearings on Mutual Funds: Hidden Fees, Misgovernance and Other Practices that 
Harm Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal Financial Management, Gov’t 
Information, Federal Services, and International Security of the S. Comm. Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004); Review of Current Investigations and Regulatory 
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new models for regulating the industry.114 In contrast to its response to the 
conflicted research scandal, Congress ultimately decided not to enact 
legislation dealing with mutual fund reform. Instead, because the SEC was 
actively engaged in reform efforts, Congress decided to await the results of 
these efforts before assessing the need for additional legislation.115 The 
SEC, in turn, brought a number of enforcement actions involving trading 
abuses against both mutual fund complexes and brokers116 and began an 
extended process of rulemaking to consider cures not only for the trading 
abuses, but also for other pervasive problems relating to mutual funds. We 
discuss first the reform efforts related to the trading abuses and provide an 
assessment of those efforts. We then examine the SEC’s broader reform 
efforts. 
1. Trading Abuses 
The SEC has consistently used two approaches to reform mutual fund 
trading practices: increasing the independence and the responsibilities of the 
mutual fund board to deter abuses (in lieu of mandating direct measures to 
deter abuses) and requiring additional disclosures about abusive practices 
and the board’s actions to deter them. 
                                                                                                                 
Actions Regarding the Mutual Fund Industry: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003-2004); Mutual Funds: Who’s Looking Out for 
Investors?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. (2003); Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses 
that Harm Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, and 
International Security of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003); Mutual 
Fund Industry Practices and Their Effect on Individual Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial 
Services, 108th Cong. (2003); The Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003: 
Hearing on H.R. 2420 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t Sponsored 
Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 113. The most-publicized proposal was for the establishment of a Mutual Fund Oversight 
Board. Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 2003, S. 1958, 108th Cong. § 201(a) (2003). 
 114. Compare Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject to a New Statutory Self-
Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115 (2005) (arguing that there should be a mutual 
fund SRO) with Donna M. Nagy, Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 11 (2006) (arguing that SEC should continue to regulate mutual funds). 
 115. Many members of Congress made statements to this effect. See, e.g., Review of Current 
Investigations and Regulatory Actions Regarding the Mutual Fund Industry: Hearings Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 1057 (2004) (statement of Sen. 
Richard C. Shelby, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs) (stating that 
“If necessary, . . . Congress stands ready to enhance the SEC’s authority through the grant of new 
authority. Hopefully, . . . [this] hearing will shed more light on what Congress should do to 
complement SEC’s efforts.). 
 116. See 2004 PAR, supra note 101 (noting that enforcement actions are pending “against ten 
mutual fund complexes to date, and others are still under investigation”); 2005 PAR, supra note 
101 (identifying several significant market timing cases); 2006 PAR, supra note 101 (noting that 
in 2006 the “SEC continued to address abuses relating to the market timing of mutual funds” and 
identifying several cases against traders and brokers who market timed); 2007 PAR, supra note 9, 
at 92 (containing language similar to 2006 PAR). 
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The centerpiece of the SEC’s reform efforts, and the most controversial 
of its rulemaking initiatives, is its rule mandating independence for 75% of 
fund directors and an independent board chair.117 According to a majority of 
the SEC Commissioners at the time the rule was adopted, a more 
independent mutual fund board was central to mutual fund reform because a 
more independent culture would deter market timing and other abuses.118 
Because mutual funds are already required to have a majority of 
independent directors,119 many commentators, including two 
Commissioners, doubted whether increasing the percentage of independent 
directors and mandating an independent chair would provide any real 
benefit to investors.120 The rule has not become effective, as the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has twice remanded it to the SEC for further 
fact-finding.121 In December 2006 the SEC solicited additional comments 
on the rule,122 but since then has taken no further action. 
The SEC also adopted several modest measures designed to strengthen 
oversight in an effort to deter trading abuses. Both mutual funds and 
registered investment advisers are required to adopt, implement and 
annually review policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent 
violations of the federal securities laws.123 They must also appoint a chief 
compliance officer, who, in the case of mutual funds, must report directly to 
the fund’s board.124 In addition, investment advisers must adopt codes of 
ethics that address, among other things, conflicts that arise from personal 
trading by advisory personnel.125 
                                                                                                                 
 117. 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(7)(i), (iv) (2007); see Investment Company Governance, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 118. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,378. 
 119. The SEC conditions ten of its exemptive rules on the fund board’s consisting of a majority 
of independent directors. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 2, 2001). 
 120. See Dissent of Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman & Paul S. Atkins, Investment 
Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,390 (July 
27, 2004). 
 121. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring SEC to 
afford the public an opportunity to comment on publicly available materials that were not made 
part of the record); U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(remanding to SEC for further findings on costs and alternatives). 
 122. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,600, 71 
Fed. Reg. 76,618 (Dec. 21, 2006). 
 123. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(1), (3) (2007). 
 124. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(4). Compliance officers had previously expressed concerns about 
market timing but lacked sufficient independence to curb the practices. GAO-05-692T, supra note 
36, at 3. 
 125. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1. In its discussion of the code of ethics rule, the SEC strongly 
urged that the code should be more than a compliance manual, as the rule was adopted in response 
to enforcement actions involving breach of fiduciary duties by investment advisers to their clients, 
including mutual funds. Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 2256, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,942, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696, at 41,696–97 (July 
9, 2004). 
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Another rule requires mutual fund boards to consider imposing 
redemption fees to discourage market timing and recoup some of the costs 
incurred as a result of short-term trading strategies.126 The rule as initially 
proposed would have required funds to impose 2% redemption fees if 
shares were held less than five days.127 Ultimately, the SEC was persuaded 
that it was the responsibility of mutual fund boards to determine whether 
redemption fees were appropriate.128 In addition, the rule requires mutual 
funds to enter into information-sharing agreements with financial 
intermediaries so that the funds can monitor the frequency of short-term 
trading in omnibus accounts and, if necessary, instruct the intermediary to 
restrict or prohibit short-term trading by fund holders who violate the fund’s 
market timing policies. 129 
The SEC frequently requires disclosure in order to encourage certain 
conduct, and it has employed this strategy to require extensive disclosures 
in the fund prospectus about funds’ policies and procedures to deter market 
timing.130 Accordingly, the prospectus must disclose the risks that short-
term trading presents for other fund holders. It must then disclose whether 
or not the fund’s board has adopted market timing policies and procedures, 
and, if it has not, it must explain the specific basis for the board’s view that 
it is appropriate for the fund not to have such policies.131 Similarly, the 
prospectus must describe any policies and procedures for deterring frequent 
purchases and redemptions.132 The prospectus must also explain both the 
circumstances under which the fund will use fair value pricing and the 
effects of fair value pricing.133 Finally, funds are required to state their 
policies with respect to disclosing information about the fund’s portfolio 
holdings.134 
Another rule requires disclosures about portfolio managers, particularly 
concerning their identities, conflicts, compensation and holdings in the 
                                                                                                                 
 126. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-2 (2007); see Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,782, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,328 (Mar. 18, 2005); Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,504, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,157 (Oct. 3, 2006). 
 127. Mandatory Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,375A, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762 (proposed Mar. 11, 2004). 
 128. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-2(a)(1); see Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,330. 
 129. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-2(a)(2). The term “financial intermediary” is defined in the rule. 
§ 270.22c-2(c)(1). 
 130. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,300 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 274). 
 131. Id. at 22,302. 
 132. Id. at 22,302–03. If the fund has adopted arrangements to permit frequent purchases and 
redemptions, however, those disclosures do not have to be in the prospectus, but in the Statement 
of Additional Information (SAI), which it not required to be given to the investor. Id. at 22,303. 
 133. Id. at 22,304–05. Fair valuation, which is required under certain circumstances, can serve 
to foreclose certain arbitrage opportunities. See id. 
 134. Id. at 22,305–06. 
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funds they manage.135 The SEC stated that increasing transparency of 
information about fund managers may assist investors in evaluating fund 
management and making investment decisions.136 
2. Assessment of Trading Abuse Reforms 
Market timing and late trading are serious problems that directly impact 
the value of investors’ holdings. The preceding recital demonstrates that the 
SEC’s reform efforts of mutual fund practices, unlike the SRO rulemaking 
dealing with conflicted research, have been neither smooth nor swift. 
Unfortunately, it remains doubtful that the SEC’s regulatory efforts will 
provide sufficient deterrence against further instances of unfair treatment of 
retail investors. 
First, increasing the independence and responsibilities of the mutual 
fund board has consistently been the SEC’s principal approach to reforming 
the mutual fund industry.137 The SEC staff’s own studies, however, cast 
doubt on whether increasing independence will have any meaningful impact 
on improving board performance.138 Moreover, the past behavior of mutual 
fund boards makes questionable whether it is a realistic solution.139 While 
the SEC has emphasized that it adopted the independent chair requirement 
to enhance independent oversight of conflict of interest transactions, not to 
enhance fund financial performance or lower fees,140 neither the studies nor 
past board performance provide solid empirical support for the proposition 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment 
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8458, Exchange Act Release No. 50,227, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,533, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,787 (Aug. 27, 2004). 
 136. Id. at 52,789. 
 137. See supra Part III.A. 
 138. See Memorandum from Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist, SEC Office of Economic 
Analysis, re: Power Study as Related to Independent Mutual Fund Chairs 1 (Dec. 29, 2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/oeamemo122906-powerstudy.pdf 
(concluding that “existing empirical studies of the effects of mutual fund governance have failed 
to consistently document a statistically significant relation between fund governance and fund 
performance, particularly with respect to board chair independence”); Memorandum from Chester 
S. Spatt, Chief Economist, SEC Office of Economic Analysis, re: Literature Review on 
Independent Mutual Fund Chairs and Directors 1 (Dec. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/oeamemo122906-litreview.pdf (drawing two main 
inferences from the literature: (1) “boards with greater proportion of independent directors are 
more likely to negotiate and approve lower fees, merge poorly performing funds more quickly or 
provide greater investor protection from late-trading and market-timing” and (2) “broad cross-
sectional analysis reveals little consistent evidence that board composition is related to lower fees 
and higher returns for fund shareholders”); SEC, EXEMPTIVE RULE AMENDMENTS OF 2004: THE 
INDEPENDENT CHAIR CONDITION 64 (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/indchair.pdf (concluding that empirical data regarding the relationship between an 
independent chair and fund performance and fees are inconclusive). But see Eric Zitzewitz, Who 
Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 245, 275–
77 (2003) (finding that funds have less market timing where boards have fewer insiders). 
 139. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 140. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 46,378, at 46,384 (July 24, 2004). 
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that independent boards will provide more effective oversight over abusive 
trading practices than they have over fund performance or costs. 
Second, the SEC’s failure to adopt a “hard close” rule141 or to require 
more current NAV determinations means that opportunities for 
sophisticated investors to engage in arbitrage activities remain.142 
Third, the increased disclosure requirements seem pro forma, and it is 
doubtful that these disclosures provide meaningful information to a mutual 
fund investor. Given the complexity of the choices investors encounter in 
selecting mutual fund investments, it seems unrealistic to expect that they 
will take into account a fund’s policies to deter trading abuses. Rather, these 
disclosures contribute to the serious problem of “information overload” for 
which mutual fund prospectuses have long been criticized.143 
Finally, whatever the merits of the SEC’s approach, increased and 
constant SEC vigilance is essential because of the intractable nature of the 
conflicts of interest involving mutual funds. Since at least part of the failure 
to detect the trading abuses was lack of sufficient resources,144 Congress 
increased the SEC’s funding so that it could hire additional examiners in 
2003.145 However, whenever there are budgetary constraints, funding for 
non-glamorous, low-profile positions like examiners is the first to go. 
                                                                                                                 
 141. The SEC proposed a rule to require that an order to purchase or redeem shares would 
receive the current day’s price only if the fund, its designated transfer agent, or a registered 
securities clearing agency received the order by the time that the fund established for calculating 
its NAV, typically 4:00 p.m. Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388, at 70,389–90 (Dec. 17, 2003). 
At the 2005 State of the Securities Industry Congressional hearing, SEC Chairman Donaldson 
stated the Agency had postponed finalizing the rule to explore technological solutions to deal with 
administrative difficulties in submitting order information by the 4:00 p.m. deadline. The State of 
the Securities Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
109th Cong. 10–11 (2005) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC). To date the 
SEC has not adopted the rule. 
 142. Professor Mercer Bullard argues that the SEC has erred in its regulatory approach by not 
focusing more on stale pricing: 
Stale pricing principally, and late trading secondarily, . . . should be the focus of the 
SEC’s enforcement actions and regulatory reforms. Instead, the Commission has 
concentrated its efforts on frequent trading, a practice that raises fundamentally 
different and less vital concerns from those raised by fund arbitrage, and in the arbitrage 
arena it has focused principally on late trading while taking virtually no new steps to 
address stale pricing. 
Mercer E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage and the SEC’s 
Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (2006). 
 143. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 144. SEC staff stated that given the number of mutual fund companies, the breadth of their 
operations, and the SEC’s limited examination resources, the SEC’s examinations were limited in 
scope and focused on discrete area that presented what the staff perceived to be the highest risks. 
GAO-05-692T, supra note 36, at 5. 
 145. Mutual Fund Trading Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 33 (2005) (testimony of Lori 
Richards, SEC, Div. of Compliance Inspections & Examinations). The number of examiners 
increased from 360 to 500. Id. 
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Indeed this appears already to have happened: In fiscal year 2006, 
examinations of both investment advisers and investment companies fell,146 
which is at least partially attributable to a decrease in resources.147 
B. COSTS AND FAIR TREATMENT 
Apart from the trading abuses that were at the heart of the mutual fund 
scandals, meaningful mutual fund reform needs to provide better solutions 
for persistent problems affecting the costs of mutual fund investments. 
Reforms need to address both costs paid directly by investors and costs 
borne by the fund that diminish the investors’ investments. The conflicts of 
interest among the investment adviser, the investment fund, and the broker-
dealers that market the funds, and the complexity of the structure that make 
mutual funds difficult for investors to understand, create additional dangers 
for investors. Fees vary widely among funds, and investors do not 
sufficiently understand their importance in selecting investments. In 
addition, funds have incentives to reward brokers for good salesmanship at 
the expense of the mutual fund investors.148 Thus, the issue of costs raises 
the fundamental issue about the fair treatment of retail investors, 
particularly the many, frequently less-sophisticated, retail investors who 
purchase mutual funds through broker-dealers. The general issue of costs 
presents three interrelated problems: (1) disclosure; (2) board oversight; and 
(3) broker-dealer practices. While the SEC has engaged in extended rule-
making processes on these questions, to date it has adopted only limited 
reforms to deal with these problems. 
1. Disclosure 
Mutual fund disclosure is dismal. As the SEC recently acknowledged, 
fund prospectuses have been universally criticized because they are “long 
and complicated” and “often prove difficult for investors to use efficiently 
in comparing their many choices.”149 The current disclosure regime for 
mutual funds does a poor job of providing investors with the necessary 
                                                                                                                 
 146. 2006 PAR, supra note 101, at 12 exh.1.3. For example, examinations of investment 
companies fell from 783 in fiscal year 2004, to 344 in 2006. Id. 
 147. Id. at 12. The statistics for fiscal year 2007 are roughly comparable. See 2007 PAR, supra 
note 9, at 28 tbl.2.5 (noting that staff resources have been dedicated to new proactive compliance 
initiatives designed to improve compliance); see also SEC, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE BUDGET 137 
(2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/2008budgetperform.pdf (identifying decrease of 
resources as a factor in fewer examinations of investment advisers and investment companies). 
 148. See John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practices for Retail Sale of Mutual Funds: 
The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685, 714 (2007) 
(concluding that “it is obvious that something needs to be done to eliminate, or at least reduce, the 
conflicts of interest that have been created by revenue sharing, directed brokerage, differential 
compensation, and soft dollar commissions”). 
 149. Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8861, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 28,064, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,790 (proposed Nov. 30, 2007). 
326 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
information to evaluate the overall costs of their investments, despite the 
importance of costs in the selection of mutual fund investments. In addition, 
many mutual funds and the broker-dealers that sell them do an equally poor 
job of educating investors about the importance of costs in selecting mutual 
funds.150 As a result, many mutual funds are sold on the basis of the fund’s 
past performance,151 and many retail investors do not pay sufficient 
attention to costs in selecting mutual fund investments. The SEC 
acknowledged that “the degree to which investors understand mutual fund 
fees and expenses remains a concern,”152 and in December 2003 published a 
concept release on improving disclosure of mutual fund transaction costs.153 
While the SEC adopted a rule requiring funds to provide periodic disclosure 
of fund expenses borne by the investors,154 more meaningful reform is long 
overdue. 
More recently, the SEC has undertaken two more ambitious rulemaking 
initiatives to improve disclosure of information to retail investors. One rule 
concerns disclosures in the prospectus provided by the fund;155 the other 
deals with disclosures made by brokers when they sell mutual fund shares 
to their customers.156 
                                                                                                                 
 150. “Virtually all financial experts . . . consider a fund’s risks, including the volatility of its 
past returns, and its expenses to be among the most important factors for investors to consider 
when selecting a fund.” BARBARA ROPER & STEPHEN BROBECK, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., 
MUTUAL FUND PURCHASE PRACTICES: AN ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/mutual_fund_survey_report.pdf. 
 151. Id. at 1–2. This survey, conducted on behalf of the Consumer Federation of America as 
part of a research project funded by the NASD Investor Education Foundation, found that only a 
third of current fund owners considered either costs or volatility to be very important in selecting 
funds. Most investors, instead, gave more weight to fund company reputation and the fund’s past 
performance. Significantly, those who purchased most of their funds directly were far more likely 
than either workplace purchasers or those who purchased most of their funds through a 
professional to consider costs important. But see INV. CO. INST., 2007 INVESTMENT COMPANY 
FACTBOOK 65 (2007), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2007_factbook.pdf (more than two-
thirds of recent fund investors considered fees and expenses as well as historical performance in 
selecting funds). 
 152. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management 
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8393, Exchange Act Release No. 49,333, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,372, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,243 (Mar. 9, 2004). 
 153. Request for Comments on Measures to Improve Disclosure of Mutual Fund Transaction 
Costs, Securities Act Release No. 8349, Exchange Act Release No. 48,952, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,313, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,819 (Dec. 24, 2003). 
 154. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management 
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 11,244. The rule also requires periodic disclosure of 
portfolio investments and past performance. Id. 
 155. Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8861, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 28,064, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,790, at 67,798 (proposed Nov. 30, 2007). 
 156. Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act 
Release No. 8358, Exchange Act Release No. 49,148, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,341, 69 Fed. Reg. 6438 (proposed Feb. 10, 2004); Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements and 
Confirmation Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 8544, Exchange Act Release No. 51,274, 
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In November 2007 the SEC proposed significant changes in the content 
and delivery of mutual fund prospectuses—what the Agency describes as 
the “potential to revolutionize the provision of information to the millions 
of mutual fund investors who rely on mutual funds for their most basic 
financial needs.”157 To deal with the “long and complicated” prospectus,158 
the SEC proposes a “layered approach to disclosure.”159 Funds would be 
required to include a summary section (three to four pages) at the front of 
the prospectus consisting of seven categories of “key information,”160 
presented in plain English in a standardized order, to enable investors to 
evaluate and compare funds. If the prospectus applies to multiple funds, the 
summary information must be presented separately for each fund.161 
In addition, the proposal would permit funds to meet the prospectus 
delivery requirements by giving a summary prospectus, consisting of the 
summary section containing the key information, and by providing the 
statutory prospectus online, with the investor having the option of 
requesting a paper copy of the statutory prospectus.162 In this way, the SEC 
expects “to create a disclosure regime that is tailored to the unique needs of 
mutual fund investors in a manner that provides ready access to information 
that investors need, want and choose to review in connection with a mutual 
fund purchase decision.”163 
The SEC’s proposal is premised on policy choices that require careful 
consideration. For example, despite Chairman Cox’s great enthusiasm for 
the Internet, the emphasis on online delivery of the statutory prospectus 
does not meet the needs of investors who do not use computers and who 
will be required to take the initiative to ask for a hard copy. Nevertheless, it 
is a long-overdue first step toward improving prospectus disclosures. The 
Agency, however, does not have an encouraging track record of moving 
forward quickly on proposals with the potential to “revolutionize” current 
practice. The SEC’s extended rule-making process on point of sale 
                                                                                                                 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,778, 70 Fed. Reg. 10,521 (reopening comment period 
Mar. 4, 2005). 
 157. Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End 
Management Investment Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. at 67,792. 
 158. Id. at 67,790. 
 159. Id. at 67,798. 
 160. Id. at 67,812. Key information includes investment objectives; fees and expenses; principal 
investment strategies, risks and performance; top-ten portfolio holdings, investment advisers and 
portfolio managers; purchase and sale of fund shares; tax information; and financial intermediary 
compensation. Id. at 67,819–21. An illustrative hypothetical summary prospectus is found in an 
appendix to the Release. Id. at 67,822–24. 
 161. Id. at 67,793. 
 162. Id. at 67,798. 
 163. Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End 
Management Investment Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. at 67,799. In addition, the SEC asks if it should 
require funds to tag any of the information using XBRL taxonomy to facilitate comparison of fund 
data. Id. at 67,804. 
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disclosure provides a telling example of the Agency’s inability to adopt 
rules that generate substantial controversy from securities professionals. 
First proposed in January 2004, the point of sale rule would require 
broker dealers to provide their customers, at the time of the sale, with 
information “regarding the costs and conflicts of interest that arise from the 
distribution of mutual fund shares.”164 Over one-third of mutual fund sales 
are done through intermediaries, principally broker-dealers, 165 and broker-
dealers typically market load funds to their less sophisticated customers.166 
Since many investors who purchase mutual funds on the advice of their 
broker frequently do not receive the prospectus from the fund until after 
they have consummated the purchase, the more meaningful opportunity for 
disclosure is from the broker at the time of sale. Investor groups have 
advocated for disclosure of targeted information and exclusion of irrelevant 
information to avoid “information overload.”167 Brokers have argued, 
however, that tailored disclosure would be too expensive and time-
consuming.168 The SEC has met with investor groups, conducted focus 
groups and engaged a consultant to assist in investor testing of possible 
forms for confirmation and point of sale disclosures. The proposal has 
generated tremendous controversy169 and, after four years, has not yet 
resulted in a final rule. Some have accused the SEC of “dragging its 
feet.”170 
2. Board Oversight 
As with trading abuses, quality of board oversight has direct bearing on 
costs. A principal function of the mutual fund board is to negotiate the 
advisory agreement.171 Evidence that mutual fund advisers frequently 
charge lower fees to other institutional clients suggests that boards do not 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act 
Release No. 8358, Exchange Act Release No. 49,148, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,341, 69 Fed. Reg. 6438, at 6438 (proposed Feb. 10, 2004). 
 165. Disclosure of Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8347, 
Exchange Act Release No. 48,939, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,928, 68 Fed. Reg. 
74,732 (proposed Dec. 24, 2003). 
 166. See John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 J. CORP. L. 739, 
745 (2007). 
 167. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale 
Disclosure Requirements for Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, and 
Other Confirmation Requirement Amendments, and Amendments to the Registration Form for 
Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70604.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
 168. See id. 
 169. The SEC received over 1000 separate letters and another 4000 standard form letters. Point 
of Sale Disclosure Requirements and Confirmation Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 
8544, Exchange Act Release No. 51,274, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,778, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 10,521, at 10,522 (reopening comment period Mar. 4, 2005). 
 170. Editorial, SEC Dragging Its Heels on Point-of-Sale Rule, INVESTMENT NEWS, Feb. 26, 
2007, at 8. 
 171. See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(c) (2006). 
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perform this responsibility well.172 The SEC’s solution for this is disclosure: 
a new rule requires additional disclosure about how mutual fund boards 
evaluate, approve and recommend shareholder approval of investment 
advisory contracts.173 
Directed brokerage arrangements174 also call into question the adequacy 
of mutual fund boards’ control of funds’ costs. Since 1981, the SEC has 
permitted fund advisers to take into account brokers’ sales of mutual fund 
shares in selecting a broker-dealer to execute the funds’ transactions.175 As 
a result, directed brokerage arrangements became commonplace among 
funds that used broker-dealers to sell their shares, even though the practice 
of trading brokerage for sales was likely to harm mutual fund investors for a 
number of reasons. Specifically, directed brokerage could adversely impact 
best execution of fund transactions, circumvent limits on distribution 
expenses, reduce the transparency of distribution expenses and give rise to 
broker conflicts of interest.176 In 2004, the SEC acknowledged the conflict 
when fund advisers are permitted to use brokerage commissions to pay for 
the distribution of mutual fund shares.177 The SEC’s solution requires a 
fund or its adviser to implement policies and procedures designed to ensure 
                                                                                                                 
 172. See Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of 
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8433, Exchange Act Release No. 49,909, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,486, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798, at 39,799 (June 30, 2004); see 
also Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 
1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165 (asserting that the mutual fund board has not lived up to 
the expectations of the 1940 Act). 
 173. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of 
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 39,799. 
 174. See generally Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 9726, at 9726–27 (proposed Mar. 1, 
2004) (providing examples of such arrangements). 
 175. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Related Interpretation Under Section 36 of 
the Investment Company Act, 46 Fed. Reg. 16,012 (Mar. 10, 1981). 
 176. Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,591, 69 Fed. Reg. 54,728, at 54,729–30 (Sept. 9, 2004). 
 177. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Franklin Advisers and Franklin Templeton Distributors to 
Pay $20 Million to Settle Charges Related to use of Brokerage Commissions to Pay for Shelf 
Space (Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-168.htm; Press Release, 
SEC, SEC Charges Pimco Entities with Failing to Disclose Their Use of Directed Brokerage to 
Pay for Shelf Space at Brokerage Firms (Sept. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-130.htm. Similar conflicts are present when an adviser or 
money manager uses client commissions to buy research from a broker dealer, a practice known 
as “soft dollars.” Moreover, the use of soft dollars further increases the difficulties for mutual fund 
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that the fund’s selection of selling brokers is not influenced by 
considerations about the sale of fund shares.178 Approval of these 
procedures by the fund’s board, including a majority of the independent 
directors, is also required.179 
The SEC has also turned its attention recently to the issue of Rule 12b-1 
fees.180 Rule 12b-1 permits the use of fund assets to pay for distribution 
costs.181 In 1980, when the SEC adopted Rule 12b-1 as a temporary 
measure, mutual funds were experiencing net redemptions and the SEC 
wished to nurture mutual fund growth.182 At that time Rule 12b-1 fees were 
relatively small amounts used to offset distribution costs like printing and 
advertising.183 Today, however, Rule 12b-1 fees have increased and are 
primarily used as a substitute for sales loads.184 Thus, Rule 12b-1 allows 
funds to transfer selling costs that otherwise the fund managers or new 
investors would bear to the existing investors in the fund.185 In addition, 
Rule 12b-1 fees contribute to investors’ confusion about the costs of mutual 
fund investments,186 particularly the less sophisticated investors who are the 
typical purchasers of load funds.187 
Rule 12b-1 places specific responsibilities on the fund’s board of 
directors and its independent directors to ensure that the fees benefit the 
fund and the fund investors. Fundamentally, the directors must conclude, 
“in the exercise of reasonable business judgment and in light of their 
fiduciary duties . . . that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plan will 
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benefit the company and its shareholders.”188 Accordingly, both a majority 
of the fund’s directors and a majority of the independent directors must 
approve the written Rule 12b-1 plan under which the fees are paid.189 In 
addition, directors must review, at least quarterly, the amounts paid and 
their purposes and must also annually approve the continuation of the 
plan.190 The benefit of Rule 12b-1 fees to the fund and its shareholders is 
typically stated to be economies of scale.191 Academic studies, however, do 
not provide much support for a showing that fund investors benefit in any 
way from Rule 12b-1 fees.192 
In 2007 the SEC held a roundtable on Rule 12b-1 fees and solicited 
comments on the rule.193 As of November 2007, it had received more than 
1,450 comment letters. Approximately 1,000 were form letters from 
financial planners and registered representatives who oppose reform.194 An 
additional 400 letters were individualized letters from financial planners, 
the majority of whom opposed substantive reform.195 Another twenty-five 
letters were from mutual funds, large broker-dealers, insurance companies, 
industry associations and counsel, the majority of whom also oppose 
substantive reform.196 Only about ten letters submitted by investors support 
reform or repeal of the rule.197 To date the SEC has not released any 
proposal for change, and signals from individual Commissioners indicate 
that significant change is unlikely. Chairman Cox has suggested that Rule 
12b-1 fees could be justified to pay for administrative services provided to 
current investors,198 and Commissioner Atkins recently expressed the view 
that the rule “had been a great success overall for investors” and requires 
only minor revisions.199 
3. Brokerage Practices 
As noted, some brokerage practices in selling mutual funds are harmful 
to mutual fund customers because of conflicts of interest that may cause 
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selling brokers to select funds for their customers for reasons other than 
their suitability for their customers’ investment goals.200 In addition, many 
brokers have overcharged customers because they did not offer them 
discounts on fees to which they were entitled by reason of the size of their 
purchases (known as “breakpoints”).201 The SEC’s response to this broker-
dealer malpractice202 was to require additional disclosure about breakpoints 
in the mutual fund’s prospectus.203 
4. Assessment 
In the past few years the SEC has proposed numerous rules in an effort 
to provide fairer treatment to retail investors in mutual funds. 
Unfortunately, while the SEC regulatory approach has been consistent, it 
has not been effective in solving these problems. The SEC rulemaking 
approach principally consists of: (1) requiring or encouraging more 
responsibilities on the mutual funds’ boards of directors, even though their 
past performance may not give cause for much confidence;204 and (2) 
requiring more information in the prospectus, even if the relevance of the 
information may not be readily apparent to the retail investor and raises the 
danger of “information overload” that investor advocates have warned 
against.205 
The poor track record of mutual fund boards is illustrated by their 
failure to negotiate lower advisory fees206 and by their approval of ever-
increasing Rule 12b-1 fees. In many ways, the history of Rule 12b-1 
provides an excellent example of what is wrong with SEC regulation of 
mutual funds. The Agency adopted a temporary solution to address a 
specific issue, what were modest fees became big fees, and the fees became 
“ingrained” in the funds and the intermediaries who sell the funds.207 The 
result is a “fund distribution system and the sometimes complicated share 
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class structures” that, according to the current Director of Investment 
Management, no one would construct if “starting from scratch.”208 
Moreover, all this occurred despite the fact that mutual fund boards must 
approve and annually review Rule 12b-1 plans.209 Nevertheless, industry 
pressure makes meaningful reforms difficult.210 
To state the obvious, the purpose of disclosure should be to provide 
useful information to investors. The SEC has a poor track record in assuring 
that mutual fund disclosures are meaningful to investors, particularly on the 
question of costs, as the point of sale disclosure process illustrates.211 Using 
disclosure to encourage more responsible fund policies and practices has 
not proven to be an effective method of improving fund governance and is 
detrimental to the principal goal of disclosure, as it contributes to the length 
and complexity of the mutual fund prospectus. 
The SEC’s poor performance in assuring fair treatment for retail 
investors in mutual funds is especially disappointing, since, unlike the 
brokerage industry, the SEC is the regulator that is responsible for the 
mutual fund “brand.” Congress floated the concept of a mutual fund SRO or 
a mutual fund-oversight board after the market timing scandals,212 and there 
were strong arguments in support of a new regulatory model.213 The 
industry, however, has consistently opposed the creation of an SRO for 
mutual funds, and Congress ultimately concluded that it would be counter-
productive to derail the SEC’s extensive rule-making efforts.214 
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IV. COMPARISON: CONFLICTED RESEARCH AND MUTUAL 
FUND REFORM 
A. THE SEC’S EFFECTIVENESS AS REGULATOR 
A comparative assessment of the conflicted research and mutual fund 
reform efforts suggests that the SEC is most effective when it oversees the 
relevant SROs, rather than when it provides direct regulation over an 
industry. In the case of conflicted research, once it became clear that 
voluntary industry efforts would not be sufficient, the SROs quickly 
shepherded through the SEC approval process rules that addressed both the 
conflicts of interest and the quality of research, which were in place before 
Congress adopted SOX. Perhaps including conflicted research in SOX 
served a valuable purpose because it kept the issue alive and provided 
incentive for the regulators to continue their efforts. The SEC’s own 
involvement was minimal. It participated in the Global Settlement, but the 
NYSAG was perceived as the dominant party. It adopted Regulation AC, 
requiring certification by analysts that the views expressed are their 
personal views and disclosure of any compensation received for specific 
recommendations. Both requirements were already encompassed under 
antifraud principles.215 In short, the SEC’s involvement may have been just 
enough to evidence a commitment to solving these problems. 
In contrast, there is no SRO to take the lead in adopting regulations to 
deal with the trading abuses or any of the other complicated, technical 
issues involving mutual fund regulation. The SEC quickly responded in the 
market timing scandal by proposing a series of rules. This was sufficient to 
persuade Congress, after holding many hearings on mutual funds, to back 
away from the creation of another regulatory body or mutual fund SRO. 
This left the SEC to address the problems on its own, and it has turned out 
to be a prolonged approach that has not significantly improved the mutual 
fund as an investment for retail investors. Because of the importance of 
mutual funds to retail investors, it is disappointing that Congress did not 
pursue better solutions to regulating the industry. If Congress is serious 
about assessing the situation after SEC reforms are in place, now would be 
a good time for that reassessment. 
B. THE SEC’S EDUCATION MISSION 
Both the conflicted research and mutual fund reforms are premised on 
the importance of providing investors with good information to make 
informed investment choices, which presupposes investors who are capable 
of understanding the information. Indeed, the SEC identifies 
“encourage[ment] and promot[ion of] informed investment decision-
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making” as a primary Agency goal,216 so that investors will have “access to 
disclosure materials that are useful” and a “better understanding of the 
operations of the nation’s securities markets.”217 The SEC’s Office of 
Investor Education and Advocacy assists the SEC “in ensuring that in all of 
the Agency’s activities, the SEC is truly ‘the Investor’s Advocate,’”218 and 
according to the SEC, it has recently “reinvigorated its focus on retail 
investors”219 with two objectives. First, it focuses on assessing the views 
and needs of retail investors and ensuring that their views inform the SEC’s 
regulatory polices and disclosure programs.220 Second, it seeks to improve 
financial literacy and help investors make informed investment decisions.221 
The SEC performs this latter function principally by producing and 
distributing educational materials both in hard copy222 and on its website.223 
The Investor Education page on the SEC website confidently asserts, 
“[while] we cannot tell you what investments to make, . . . we can tell you 
how to invest wisely and avoid fraud.”224 The information available 
includes basics on budgeting and saving,225 a primer on fundamental 
investment principles,226 a calculator for mutual fund costs,227 and a variety 
of brochures on avoiding investment scams.228 While the advice is sound, 
the presentation is not of the quality found in comparable publications 
prepared by securities firms.229 However, the fact that the SEC, and not the 
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securities industry, provides this information may give it greater credibility 
with a retail customer, although it is difficult to assess this. 
Perhaps Professor James Fanto was right when he suggested, in an 
earlier examination of the SEC’s investor-education efforts, that the SEC is 
not in the best position to educate consumers, because, “the SEC staff 
simply lacks the continuous contact with consumers, the strong profit 
motive and/or the need to justify its existence that would enable it to design 
and tailor general education efforts to consumers’ needs.”230 Nevertheless, 
one of the principal purposes of the federal securities laws, to provide better 
information to investors, necessarily depends on an investing public capable 
of understanding the information, either by themselves or with a financial 
services provider. At a time when the government expects citizens to 
provide for their financial security through their own investments, the 
government cannot leave investor education solely in the hands of the 
marketplace. 
Considering the importance of investor education, it is disappointing 
that the SEC has not taken a prominent role in exploring better ways to 
educate investors. As part of the Global Settlement, the securities firms paid 
$55 million for investor education, and the SEC, with great fanfare, 
announced the creation of an investment education entity that would 
examine more creative ways of educating investors and would become “a 
national treasure that will benefit investors for years to come.”231 About 
eighteen months later, however, this entity was disbanded and the funds 
folded into the NASD Investor Education Foundation (now the FINRA 
Investor Education Foundation).232 Today the FINRA Investor Education 
Foundation is the largest foundation in the United States dedicated to 
investor education.233 Its mission is to “provide investors with high-quality, 
easily accessible information and tools to better understand the markets and 
the basic principles of saving and investing,”234 and it has an active grant 
program to fund educational or research projects to accomplish this.235 To 
date it has awarded thirty-nine grants totaling $10.4 million.236 
                                                                                                                 
 230. See Fanto, supra note 22, at 161–62 (emphasis added). 
 231. Press Release, SEC, Commission Investor Education Plan Approved; Investor Education 
Organization Leaders Named (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-
40.htm. 
 232. Press Release, SEC, Revised Investor Education Funding Plan Approved (Sept. 2, 2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-124.htm. For a fuller account of the missteps in 
the creation of the investor education entity, see Schack, supra note 94. 
 233. FINRA Investor Education Foundation—About Us, http://www.finrafoundation.org/ 
about_us.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). 
 234. Id. 
 235. FINRA Investor Education Foundation—Grants, http://www.finrafoundation.org/ 
grants.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). 
 236. Descriptions of awards are available at its website, as well as links to the results of 
completed projects. See FINRA FAQ, http://answers.atgnow.com/finra (follow “FINRA 
Foundation” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); FINRA Investor Education Foundation—
2008] Are Retail Investors Better Off Today? 337 
V. CONCLUSION 
The conflicted research and mutual fund reforms were undertaken for 
the express purpose of restoring the confidence of retail investors. Investor 
confidence takes on a different meaning today, as, increasingly, retail 
investors have no choice but to invest and take charge of their own 
investments for their financial security. The issue that should concern 
policy makers and regulators is not the specter of retail investors fleeing 
from the market, the traditional explanation for the importance of investor 
confidence. Rather, the likelihood that investors will be forced to participate 
in markets that they do not understand and that they do not perceive as fair 
should drive current reform efforts. Effective reform requires finding 
workable solutions to provide better protection for retail investors. To date 
the SEC has failed to enact reforms to accomplish this, even in response to 
two highly publicized examples of regulatory failure to address recognized 
industry practices that inflicted harm on retail investors. This article began 
by identifying four prerequisites for investor confidence. It concludes by 
repeating those prerequisites and summarizing the SEC’s progress to date. 
Reasonable belief in honest and fair treatment. While the SROs’ rules 
have reduced the conflicts in sell-side research, the result is less research 
available to retail investors, and the SEC does not appear to consider the 
lack of research important. The SEC’s mutual fund efforts do not inspire 
confidence in its ability or commitment to craft regulatory policies to deter 
industry practices that unfairly harm investors. In both instances, regulatory 
vigilance to enforce these policies is essential, yet the SEC has reduced its 
examinations of mutual funds. 
Availability of accurate, useful information presented in a clear 
fashion. In the aftermath of the conflicted research and mutual fund 
scandals, regulators have done a poor job of determining what information 
is meaningful to retail investors. The SEC does not appear to have 
considered whether retail investors can be expected to read issuer 
disclosures or whether they need reliable third-party research. Mutual fund 
disclosures have long been acknowledged as confusing to investors, yet the 
SEC has been slow to take on this issue. Instead, its reforms mandating 
additional disclosure of questionable value to the retail investor have 
contributed to “information overload.” 
Investor education is an important aspect of fairness. The SEC’s efforts 
on behalf of investor education have been more of a slogan than regulatory 
action. It is disappointing that the Agency has not taken a leadership role in 
exploring more effective methods to educate investors. 
A regulatory agency that is performing its responsibilities competently 
and consistently, not just in response to scandals. Perhaps the most 
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optimistic assessment at this point is that the SEC has plenty of unfinished 
business to attend to. 
A real danger of the SEC efforts is that retail investors may perceive 
that the reforms justify a renewed confidence in the markets and therefore 
investors may develop an unwarranted sense of investor confidence. If the 
reforms did not result in meaningful change, then America’s investors are 
doomed to repeat the boom and bust cycle that will eventually lead to 
another wave of scandals that will, in turn, once again shake investors’ 
confidence in the fairness of the securities markets. Investors may 
reasonably ask what are they supposed to do to provide for their financial 
security and who will help them? 
